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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
REIT Capital Structure:
CORNELL CENTER FOR HOSPITALITY RESEARCH
by Eva Steiner
An analysis of the capital structure of commercial real estate investment trusts finds that the strongest REITs overall tend to employ lower leverage and longer debt maturity, maintain larger proportions of fixed-rate debt, rely less on secured debt, have a greater line of credit capacity but use it less, and hold 
smaller cash reserves. The REITs’ strength is measured by Tobin’s q, which expresses the ratio of 
the market value of assets relative to their book value. The study examines yearly data for the years 
1993 through 2013 for 137 REITs based in the United States and the years 2001 through 2013 for 50 
REITs in France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Looking specifically at hotel 
REITs, the study found generally similar outcomes in terms of the capital-structure characteristics 
associated with the strongest hotel firms, although their q ratios were lower overall. However, 
hotel REITs tended to have greater leverage, shorter debt maturity, and more cash on hand to 
market value than REITs as a whole. The financial crisis of 2007-09 highlighted the value of limited 
leverage, as well as fixed-rate and secured debt.
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The optimal capital structure of a firm—particularly a real estate investment trust—is a complex package encompassing multiple dimensions. Inherent in this complexity is the principle that a REIT’s capital structure connects directly to its performance. For this reason, I sought to identify those combinations of REIT capital-structure 
characteristics that are empirically related to superior firm quality. 
REIT Capital Structure:
The Value of Getting It Right
by Eva Steiner
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Recognizing that international disparities in legal, 
institutional, and tax systems may have significant impli-
cations for the empirical links between the composition 
of capital structure and firm value in different countries, 
I further sought to contrast and compare the empirical 
links between capital structure and firm quality for REITs 
in the United States and four European nations. I also ana-
lyzed the factors that support firm quality for hotel REITs, 
given their distinctive underlying structure.
Finally, I consider the effects of the global financial 
crisis and the subsequent recovery, by examining how the 
links between the composition of capital structure and 
firm value vary through the real estate and capital market 
cycle. 
In this empirical analysis, I study a sample of inter-
national, listed real estate investment firms from the U.S. 
and four European countries, namely, France, Germany, 
the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Due to data 
availability, the U.S. analysis runs from 1993 through 
2013, while the European data cover 2001 through 2013. I 
include all firms reported on the SNL Financial database 
that are classified as listed equity REITs or listed property 
companies in the sample countries.1 As detailed in Exhibit 
1, the number of firms grew from year to year, particularly 
in the United States, which totaled 137 REITs in the final 
year of the analysis. The number of European REITs was 
much smaller, as Germany had three REITs in the data-
base; France, seventeen; the Netherlands, five; and the 
United Kingdom, twenty-five. 
1 Acquired by McGraw Hill Financial in 2015, SNL Financial is 
now part of S&P Global Market Intelligence.  
marketintelligence.spglobal.com/
Country Min Max N
France 6 17 150
Germany 2 3 16
Netherlands 5 5 60
United Kingdom 9 25 234
United States 45 137 1876
Exhibit 1
Sample size and evolution
 Note: The number of REITs listed on the SNL 
database expanded during the study period. 
Firms that were formed during the study period 
enter the sample when they first appear on SNL. 
Firms that were acquired or went out of 
business during the sample period are included 
for as long as they are active on SNL and 
dropped when they become inactive, to avoid 
survivorship and selection bias.
U.S.
U.S.
Europe United Kingdom
France
GermanyNetherlands
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First, I employ an unconditional multivariate analy-
sis to identify those combinations of capital structure 
characteristics that are associated with stronger firm 
quality. For the sample as a whole and U.S. firms specifi-
cally, the study finds that stronger firms tend to employ 
lower leverage and longer debt maturity, maintain larger 
proportions of fixed-rate debt, rely less on secured debt, 
have greater line of credit capacity but use it less, and 
hold smaller cash reserves. With regard to the European 
firms, however, the only significant result is that stronger 
firms have lower leverage. 
Next, the analysis explores the marginal impact of in-
dividual dimensions of capital structure on firm value in 
the full sample, conditioned on existing firm and capital 
structure characteristics. These results largely support the 
findings that secured debt and high leverage are individu-
ally associated with lower firm quality. However, this con-
ditional analysis reveals a positive relationship between 
secured debt and firm quality for U.S. REITs. This finding 
suggests that highly levered firms may be able to mitigate 
the (negative) effects of higher leverage on firm quality by 
pledging collateral. 
Of particular interest to the hospitality industry, these 
data allow an analysis of the relationship between capital 
structure and firm quality for hotel REITs as compared 
to REITs as a whole. In general, hotel REITs have slightly 
lower q ratios than the industry as a whole. Hotel REITs 
also have somewhat greater leverage and cash holdings, 
two factors that are associated with lower q ratios. The 
final analysis examines changes in Tobin’s q in relation 
to capital structures during and after the financial panic 
of 2007–09. Firms with relatively low leverage and solid 
amounts of fixed-rate and secured debt generally had the 
best q ratios during that period. Investors also seemed 
to appreciate REITs with more cash on hand, contrary to 
normal times.
These results have significant practical implications 
for managers and investors of international listed real 
estate firms. First, my findings assist managers in optimiz-
ing multiple dimensions of capital structure choices to 
improve firm value, depending on the characteristics of 
the firm, the institutional environment and the prevail-
ing capital market regime. Second, the findings provide 
guidance for investors in international real estate firms in 
drawing inferences about firm quality from the composi-
tion of corporate capital structure in different countries 
and at different points in the cycle. Overall, these con-
clusions offer substantial benefits for financial decision-
makers by promoting well-informed capital structure and 
investment choices.
Exhibit 2
Financial characteristics of U.S. and European REITs
Variable
United States Europe
N Mean SD N Mean SD
q-ratio 1876 1.28*** 0.27 460 0.99 0.19
Market leverage 1876 0.47 0.18 453 0.52 0.19
Debt maturity 1655 0.54 0.22 0 n/a n/a
Fixed-rate to total debt 1808 0.77*** 0.21 391 0.69 0.28
Secured debt to total debt 1806 0.63 0.35 353 0.74 0.36
Convertible debt to total debt 1806 0.02 0.08 439 0.02 0.07
Revolving credit facilities to total assets 1849 0.15** 0.11 22 0.10 0.13
Share of credit facilities drawn 1693 0.36*** 0.30 15 0.10 0.20
Cash to market value 1871 0.02 0.05 453 0.04 0.06
UPREIT to total equity 1875 0.08 0.13 0 n/a n/a
FFO payout ratio 1609 0.70 0.26 0 n/a n/a
Market value of the firm ($m) 1876 1720** 2900 460 1460 2160
Profitability 1875 0.08*** 0.05 433 0.05 0.09
Earnings volatility 1603 0.03 0.07 293 0.10 0.09
 Note: U.S. REIT data are for the period 1993–2013; European REIT data are for 2001–13.
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Variable
Germany France United Kingdom Netherlands
N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD
q-ratio 16 0.92 0.12 150 1.06 0.23 234 0.95 0.16 60 0.98 0.10
Market 
leverage
10 0.57 0.13 150 0.56 0.19 233 0.50 0.20 60 0.48 0.09
Fixed-rate to 
total debt
16 0.38 0.35 108 0.67 0.33 219 0.74 0.24 48 0.63 0.22
Secured 
debt to total 
debt
16 1.00 0.00 75 0.63 0.40 224 0.81 0.32 38 0.46 0.38
Convertible 
debt to total 
debt
16 0.00 0.00 136 0.03 0.07 227 0.01 0.04 60 0.04 0.12
Revolving 
credit 
facilities to 
total assets
0 n/a n/a 1 0.07 n/a 10 0.16 0.16 11 0.05 0.08
Share of 
credit 
facilities 
drawn
1 n/a n/a 0 n/a n/a 9 0.11 0.22 6 0.10 0.18
Cash to 
market 
value
16 0.07 0.04 150 0.03 0.03 227 0.05 0.08 60 0.02 0.02
Market value 
of the firm 
($m)
16 286 248 150 2230 2900 234 1070 1700 60 1330 978
Profitability 16 0.03 0.03 136 0.06 0.05 225 0.04 0.11 56 0.06 0.05
Earnings 
volatility
7 0.03 0.02 91 0.06 0.05 155 0.14 0.10 40 0.06 0.03
Exhibit 3
Financial characteristics of European REITs
Data and Method
The study included all firms reported on the SNL Finan-
cial database that are classified as equity REITs in France, 
Germany, the Netherlands, the U.K., and the U.S. All 
firm-level data are obtained from SNL. The sample period 
for U.S. REITs begins in 1993, because this is the inception 
of the modern REIT era marked by the introduction of the 
UPREIT legislation.2 European coverage on SNL begins in 
2001. The initial sample contains a total of 2,336 firm-year 
observations. I measure firm value using Tobin’s q ratio, 
which is the ratio of the market value of assets relative to 
2 Umbrella partnership REITs (UPREITS) were developed in the 
U.S. in response to the real estate crash of the early 1990s, when real es-
tate owners needed a non-taxable way to infuse cash into their portfo-
lios. Rather than the traditional method of transferring real estate into 
a REIT (generally a taxable event), UPREIT participants contributed 
property to the partnership in exchange for limited-partnership units 
(not typically taxable). Europe has no corresponding structure.
their book value.3 I relate Tobin’s q to a broad range of 
capital structure characteristics. In this regression analysis, 
I also add a set of control values based on relevant firm 
characteristics.
Descriptive Statistics
As shown in the tables in Exhibits 2 and 3, the q ratio 
for U.S. firms is on average higher than those in Europe 
(mean of 1.28 versus 0.99) but also more volatile (standard 
deviation of 0.27 versus 0.19). U.S. firms are significantly 
larger than European firms by market value ($1.72 billion 
versus $1.46 billion) and more profitable (EBITDA to 
total assets ratio of 0.08 versus 0.05). Although U.S. and 
European REITs have similar firm and capital structure 
characteristics on a number of dimensions, U.S. REITs use 
3 Tobin, J. (1969): “A General Equilibrium Approach to Monetary 
Theory,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 1(1), 15–29.
 Note: European REIT data are for 2001–13.
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significantly more fixed-rate debt (0.77 versus 0.69). That 
comparison does not take into account European firms’ 
possible use of swap contracts to fix interest rates. U.S.  
REITs have significantly higher line of credit capacity  
(0. 15, measured relative to total assets) and a higher share 
of credit facilities drawn (0.36) than European firms (0.10 
for both). 
Comparing the REITs in Europe, I found little 
cross-country variation in q ratios, leverage, convertible 
debt, cash holdings, or profitability. I did, however, find 
significant differences in the share of fixed-rate debt, with 
Germany low, at 0.38, and the U.K. high, at 0.74. The share 
of secured debt also has a substantial range, with the 
Netherlands at 0.46 and Germany at 1.0. Revolving credit 
facilities are rare in Europe (I observed just 22), and line-of-
credit capacity varies significantly across countries from a 
minimum of 0.05 of assets (Netherlands) to a maximum of 
0.16 (U.K.). The use of these credit facilities appears to be 
more homogeneous, with an average of approximately 0.10 
in both the Netherlands and the U.K. France is home to the 
largest European firms (mean market value of $2.23 billion), 
while the smallest firms are in Germany ($0.29 billion). 
Earnings volatility varies between a minimum of 0.03 in 
Germany and a maximum of 0.14 in the U.K.
I find a number of significant and numerically high 
correlations between firm quality (q ratio) and capital 
structure characteristics (as shown in Exhibit 4). There are 
inverse correlations between the q ratio and leverage, the 
share of secured debt, the share of credit facilities drawn, 
and cash holdings. Conversely, I find positive correlations 
Exhibit 4
Selected cross-correlations for main capital structure characteristics, full sample
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
(1) q-ratio 1.0000
(2) Market leverage -0.4535* 1.0000
(3) Debt maturity 0.1032* 0.0597 1.0000
(4) Fixed-rate debt 0.1613* 0.0449 0.4709* 1.0000
(5) Secured debt -0.2094* 0.3204* -0.0269 0.0111 1.0000
(6) Convertible debt 0.0158 -0.0380 0.0140 0.0194 -0.2468* 1.0000
(7) Credit facilities 0.0921* -0.1356* -0.2247* -0.2795* -0.1908* 0.0073 1.0000
(8) Facilities drawn -0.1574* 0.2499* -0.2982* -0.3860* -0.0214 0.0074 0.2377* 1.0000
(9) Cash -0.1476* -0.1122* -0.0002 0.0180 0.1935* -0.0098 -0.1904* -0.2589* 1.0000
(10) UPREIT equity 0.0448 0.2938* -0.0338 0.0508 0.2414* -0.1131* -0.1174* 0.1422* -0.0728* 1.0000
(11) Payout ratio 0.0364 -0.0875* 0.0606 0.0183 -0.1287* 0.0692* 0.0909* 0.0600 -0.1276* -0.0719* 1.0000
 Note: * p < .01. The table presents the pairwise Pearson correlation coefficients for the capital structure and firm characteristics of the equity REITs in the sample over the 
period 1993–2013 (for U.S.) and 2001–2013 (for Europe) combined. Source: SNL Financial. 
between the q ratio and debt maturity, fixed-rate debt, 
and revolving credit facility capacity.
Empirical method. To identify the capital struc-
ture characteristics that strong firms have in common, I 
first employed an unconditional multivariate analysis 
to identify those combinations of capital structure 
characteristics that are associated with a high value of 
Tobin’s q. For this purpose, I sorted all firm-year obser-
vations into quintiles ranked by Tobin’s q (quintile 1 con-
tains the firms with the lowest q ratio). I then tabulated 
the corresponding mean capital structure characteristics 
in each quintile to test the hypothesis that these means 
differ significantly across the top and bottom quintiles.
The next step was to isolate the marginal impact of 
changes in individual capital structure characteristics on 
firm quality, holding other factors equal. To do so, I ran 
an ordinary least squares regression analysis for each 
firm in each year, estimating the q ratio as a function of 
the firm’s capital structure characteristics and the set of 
relevant firm characteristic control variables in that year. 
I estimate the following regression model:
Qit = α + β1MLevit + β2Fixit + β3Secit + β4Conit + β5Cashit + 
β6Sizeit + β7Profit + β8Volit + uit
Results
Capital structure characteristics that strong firms have 
in common. The strongest and most robust result is a 
negative relationship between Tobin’s q and leverage 
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Exhibit 5
Capital structure characteristics by quintile
Quintile q-ratio
Market 
leverage
Debt 
maturity
Fixed-
rate debt
Secured 
debt 
Convertible 
debt
Revolving 
credit 
facilities 
Share of 
facilities 
drawn
Cash to 
market 
value
UPREIT 
to total 
equity
FFO 
payout 
ratio
1 0.867 0.585 0.468 0.685 0.726 0.026 0.131 0.498 0.037 0.023 0.648
2 1.055 0.544 0.526 0.760 0.750 0.020 0.132 0.389 0.035 0.084 0.674
3 1.189 0.490 0.533 0.778 0.662 0.017 0.146 0.340 0.020 0.087 0.713
4 1.340 0.421 0.555 0.770 0.591 0.028 0.153 0.341 0.017 0.075 0.743
5 1.643 0.351 0.562 0.805 0.526 0.023 0.155 0.308 0.018 0.053 0.696
Difference 0.776*** -0.234*** 0.093*** 0.120*** -0.200*** -0.002 0.0239* -0.190*** -0.019*** 0.030*** 0.045**
t-stat (92.07) (-20.53) (4.62) (7.63) (-8.25) (-0.41) (2.50) (-6.94) (-5.79) (5.16) (1.99)
1 0.934 0.589 0.468 0.711 0.723 0.021 0.132 0.468 0.039 0.023 0.648
2 1.128 0.532 0.526 0.788 0.713 0.018 0.137 0.355 0.022 0.084 0.674
3 1.245 0.468 0.533 0.777 0.616 0.027 0.154 0.351 0.018 0.087 0.713
4 1.389 0.404 0.555 0.785 0.570 0.025 0.152 0.326 0.016 0.075 0.743
5 1.682 0.345 0.562 0.811 0.531 0.023 0.155 0.306 0.018 0.053 0.696
Difference 0.749*** -0.244*** 0.093*** 0.010*** -0.192*** 0.001 0.0232** -0.162*** -0.021*** 0.030*** 0.045**
t-stat (79.36) (-18.80) (4.62) (6.11) (-7.48) (0.25) (2.73) (-6.74) (-4.62) (5.16) (1.99)
1 0.776 0.605 n/a 0.649 0.695 0.024 n/a n/a 0.035 0.000 n/a
2 0.896 0.555 n/a 0.720 0.770 0.028 0.055 0.000 0.035 0.000 n/a
3 0.962 0.554 n/a 0.713 0.809 0.027 0.049 0.000 0.034 0.000 n/a
4 1.044 0.490 n/a 0.726 0.818 0.014 0.111 0.155 0.048 0.000 n/a
5 1.263 0.402 n/a 0.657 0.592 0.020 0.178 0.211 0.029 0.000 n/a
Difference 0.487*** -0.204*** n/a 0.008 -0.103 -0.004 n/a n/a -0.006 n/a n/a
t-stat (23.92) (-6.99) n/a (0.17) (-1.50) (-0.39) n/a n/a (-0.85) n/a n/a
Al
l R
EI
Ts
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
Eu
ro
pe
 Note: U.S. data for 1993–2013; European data for 2001–13. Fifth quintile represents strongest firms. Difference is between the mean variable values across for the fifth and first 
Tobin’s q quintile, alongside the corresponding t-statistic from a two-group mean-comparison test Significance indicated as follows: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: 
SNL Financial.
across all firms (presented in the top panel of Exhibit 
5). The strongest firms on average have a leverage ratio 
of 0.35, whereas the weakest firms on average have a 
significantly higher leverage ratio of 0.59. Further, stron-
ger firms on average have higher proportions of fixed-rate 
debt than weak firms (0.80 versus 0.69) and lower shares 
of secured debt (0.53 versus 0.73). These findings suggest 
that reliance on variable rate debt is a sign of weakness, 
and further that weaker firms are required to pledge col-
lateral when borrowing capital.4 I also find that stronger 
firms hold less cash (0.02 versus 0.04).
4 E. Giambona, A.S. Mello, and T.J. Riddiough (2012): “Collateral 
and the Limits of Debt Capacity: Theory and Evidence” (working 
paper).
The analysis of the U.S. REITs (middle panel of 
Exhibit 5) reveals that stronger firms have longer debt 
maturity (0.56 versus 0.47), consistent with the notion that 
debt maturity should match the maturity of the assets be-
ing financed.5 Further, stronger U.S. firms have higher line 
of credit capacity than weak firms (0.15 to 0.13 relative to 
total assets) but rely less heavily on drawing on these fa-
cilities (0.31 to 0.47 of capacity drawn). Stronger firms also 
have more UPREIT equity (0.05 versus 0.02), and a higher 
FFO payout ratio (0.70 versus 0.65).
The analysis of the European firms (bottom panel of 
Exhibit 5) confirms the inverse relationship between firm 
5 SNL data are insufficient in these areas to provide a similar 
analysis of European REITs.
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Variables
(1)  
All
(2) 
US
(3) 
Europe
(4) 
Non-crisis
(5) 
Crisis
Market leverage -0.766*** -0.778*** -0.281** -0.757*** -0.790***
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.11)
Fixed-rate to total debt 0.126** 0.079 0.016 0.106* 0.183**
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08)
Secured debt to total debt 0.049 0.087* 0.006 0.062 0.031
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05)
Convertible debt <-0.01* <-0.01** <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Cash to market value -0.191 -0.669* 0.448 -0.538 0.675*
(0.32) (0.36) (0.31) (0.36) (0.40)
Log of firm size 0.025** 0.041*** 0.015 0.027** 0.019
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Profitability 0.734*** 0.820*** 0.320*** 0.866*** 0.515***
(0.17) (0.31) (0.09) (0.27) (0.19)
Earnings volatility -0.637*** -0.156 -0.493*** -0.610*** -0.901***
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.20) (0.30)
Constant 1.096*** 0.956*** 0.932*** 1.081*** 1.108***
(0.20) (0.21) (0.17) (0.21) (0.26)
Observations 1,759 1,538 221 1,368 391
R-squared 0.462 0.467 0.403 0.431 0.558
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exhibit 6
Regression results for Tobin’s q and capital structure characteristics
 Note: U.S. data are for 1993–2013; European data for 2001–13. Crisis period is 2007–09. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Significance is indicated as 
follows: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: SNL Financial.
value and leverage found in U.S. firms, but this is the only 
significant finding for the European REITs. This may be 
because there are relatively fewer European observations, 
but it is worth noting that the differences between the top 
and bottom quintiles across the firm characteristics in the 
European REITs generally carry the same signs as those of 
U.S. REITs.
The characteristic quintiles of the European firms 
appear to be more homogeneous on average than the 
quintiles of the U.S. firms. It is also possible that investors 
in European firms may be less sensitive to variation in 
capital structure characteristics or that they penalize firms 
with sub-optimal capital structure characteristics less 
heavily. If that interpretation is correct, one could further 
argue that optimal capital structure is less directly related 
to firm value in Europe than in the U.S. It may be that 
other factors, such as the relative cost of different types 
of capital, may have a stronger impact on firm value in 
Europe than they do for the U.S. REITs.
The relationship between Tobin’s q and variation in 
individual capital structure characteristics. Controlling 
for relevant firm characteristics, one again sees an inverse 
relationship between leverage and firm quality. As shown 
in Exhibit 6, a one-standard-deviation increase in lever-
age results in a 14-basis-point drop in Tobin’s q across all 
firms. However, the marginal effect of leverage on firm 
quality varies across geography and time. Leverage is 
penalized more heavily in the U.S. (also a 14-point drop) 
than in Europe (a drop of 5 points). Similarly, higher 
leverage was penalized slightly more heavily during the 
crisis (15-point drop) than outside of the crisis period 
(14-point drop).
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structure exposes them to increased bankruptcy risk may 
be able to mitigate the effects of leverage on measures of 
firm quality and continue to gain access to debt markets 
by pledging collateral for debt capital.
One other factor associated with a lower q ratio is 
higher cash holdings, at least for U.S. REITs. This finding 
echoes earlier work showing that bank lines are a substi-
tute for cash in REITs, and that stronger firms have less 
need to hold cash because they have greater untapped 
capacity for long-term debt and lines of credit.6 Given that 
a major reason for investing in a REIT is its cash payout, 
these stronger firms comply with investor preferences by 
reducing excess cash holdings, knowing they are secure in 
tapping capital and liquidity going forward. This interpre-
tation is further consistent with recent studies on liquidity 
and capital structure, highlighting a crucial distinction 
between firms being cash constrained and financially 
constrained.7 Yet, strong firms held extra cash during the 
financial crisis. Thus, the findings suggest that investors 
take a positive view of firms being able to rely on cash 
reserves when external sources of funds dry up because of 
capital market turmoil.
Focus on the U.S. Hotel REIT Sector
An analysis of the characteristics of U.S. hotel REITs  
found that the relationship of their financial structure to 
the q ratio is similar to those of the sample as a whole (see 
Exhibit 7). However, hotel REITs are generally not in the 
top tier in terms of their financial characteristics.
The sample of hotel REITs achieved an average q ratio 
of 1.13 overall, as compared to the strongest REITs, which 
scored 1.68. Hotel REIT market leverage was on average 
higher than the mean value associated with the REITs 
that achieved the highest q ratios (0.51 versus 0.35). Along 
similar lines, the share of secured debt for hotel REITs was 
0.78 versus 0.53 for top firms, the share of credit facilities 
drawn was 0.35 for hotels versus 0.30 for the full sample, 
and UPREIT equity for hotel REITs was 0.10 versus 
0.05. Hotel REIT debt maturity was shorter than that of 
the strongest REITs (0.50 versus 0.56), and the share of 
fixed-rate debt was 0.69 for hotels versus 0.80 for other 
REITs. Hotel REITs’ share of convertible debt (0.02), cash 
6 T.J. Riddiough and Z. Wu (2009): “Financial Constraints, 
Liquidity Management, and Investment,” Real Estate Economics, 37(3), 
447–481.
7 Damodaran, A. Corporate Finance: Theory and Practice (New 
York: John Wiley and Sons, 2001); M. Campello, J.R. Graham, and C.R. 
Harvey (2010): “The Real Effects of Financial Constraints: Evidence 
from a Financial Crisis,” Journal of Financial Economics, 97(3), 470–487; 
and M. Campello, E. Giambona, J.R. Graham, and C.R. Harvey (2011): 
“Liquidity Management and Corporate Investment during a Financial 
Crisis,” Review of Financial Studies, 24(6), 1944–1979.
With regard to the positive relationship between 
fixed-rate debt and firm quality, my calculation shows 
a 3-point increase in the q ratio for a one-standard-de-
viation increase in the share of fixed-rate debt. I further 
find that higher shares of fixed-rate debt in the capital 
structure had a stronger impact on firm quality during the 
crisis (4-point increase) than outside the crisis (increase of 
2 points). The nature of the financial crisis highlighted the 
benefits of fixed-rate debt, as the supply of debt capital 
diminished, thus increasing firms’ refinancing risk.
Although the effect is small in economic terms, I also 
find that firm quality is inversely related to the share of 
convertible debt, consistent with the notion that the issu-
ance of convertible securities is a sign of weakness, with 
firms trading off a lower current rate for future convert-
ibility. These firms—primarily found in the U.S.—are also 
likely to be financially constrained, restricting their ability 
to exploit investment opportunities and thus grow the 
value of the firm. The data indicate that European REITs 
are unlikely to use convertible debt.
The regression results for the U.S. firms suggest that, 
all else being equal, an increase in secured debt is related 
to an increase in Tobin’s q. However, there is a 32-percent 
correlation between leverage and the share of secured 
debt, and a strong and consistent negative relationship 
between leverage and firm quality. On an unconditional 
basis, both secured debt and leverage are separately relat-
ed to lower firm quality. The conditional analysis reveals 
that highly levered, poorer quality firms whose capital 
Exhibit 7
Mean and standard deviation of capital structure 
characteristics for U.S. hotel REITs
Variable N Mean SD
Market-to-book ratio 291 1.13 0.19
Market leverage 291 0.51 0.20
Debt maturity 259 0.50 0.28
Fixed-rate debt to total debt 284 0.69 0.27
Secured debt to total debt 286 0.78 0.32
Convertible debt to total debt 286 0.02 0.06
Revolving credit facilities to total assets 290 0.17 0.16
Share of credit facilities drawn 270 0.35 0.33
Cash to market value 291 0.03 0.05
UPREIT to total equity 290 0.10 0.16
FFO payout ratio 219 0.55 0.32
 Note: Data are for 1993–2013. Source: SNL Financial
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Exhibit 8
Regression results with interaction terms for US Hotel REITs
Variables Full period Non-crisis Crisis
Market leverage -0.815*** -0.839*** -0.661***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.13)
Hotel*Market leverage 0.262* 0.315* -0.201
(0.15) (0.17) (0.27)
Debt maturity 0.061 0.052 0.123
(0.04) (0.04) (0.09)
Hotel*Debt maturity -0.389*** -0.402*** -0.537***
(0.10) (0.12) (0.16)
Fixed-rate debt to total debt 0.044 0.057 -0.077
(0.05) (0.05) (0.16)
Hotel*Fixed-rate debt to total debt 0.025 0.048 0.312
(0.09) (0.11) (0.26)
Secured debt to total debt 0.112*** 0.112*** 0.149**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06)
Hotel*Secured debt to total debt 0.051 0.062 -0.001
(0.07) (0.09) (0.15)
Convertible debt -0.000* -0.000** 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Hotel*Convertible debt 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Revolving credit facilities (capacity) 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Hotel*Revolving credit facilities (capacity) 0.000 0.000 -0.000**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Share of credit facilities drawn 0.003 -0.005 0.042
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06)
Hotel*Share of credit facilities drawn -0.110 -0.134* 0.389*
(0.07) (0.08) (0.20)
Cash to market value -0.665** -0.676** -0.953
(0.30) (0.30) (0.68)
Hotel*Cash to market value 1.124 1.459** 1.413
(0.79) (0.72) (1.24)
UPREIT to total equity 0.105 0.154* -0.189
(0.10) (0.09) (0.14)
Hotel*UPREIT to total equity 0.414** 0.325 0.397
(0.20) (0.20) (0.37)
FFO payout ratio 0.001** 0.001** 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Hotel*FFO payout ratio -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 1,766 1,507 259
R-squared 0.525 0.502 0.710
Sector effects, control variables, constant Yes Yes Yes
 Note: data are for 1993–
2013. Robust standard 
errors are shown in 
parentheses. Significance is 
indicated as follows: * p < 
0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Source: SNL Financial.
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holdings (0.03), and revolving credit facilities available 
(0.17) were on average similar to the benchmark. 
To determine the effects of individual capital struc-
ture choices on the q ratio of hotel REITs relative to the 
overall sample of U.S. REITs, I replicate the regression 
analysis shown in Exhibit 6, but add an interaction term 
between the hotel REIT sector indicator and the capital 
structure variables of interest, with the results shown in 
Exhibit 8.
Overall, hotel REITs are not that different from other 
commercial REITs, but I did find some specific variations 
in the effects of capital structure (see Exhibit 9). For exam-
ple, both types of REIT showed a negative coefficient on 
the market leverage variable overall, consistent with the 
prior results. However, I also find a significantly positive 
interaction term between market leverage and the hotel 
REIT indicator, suggesting that investors tolerate more 
leverage in hotel REITs than in REITs overall. Neverthe-
Exhibit 9
Comparison of coefficient estimates between US hotel and other commercial REITs
 Note: The graph presents the comparison between coefficient estimates on different capital structure characteristics across hotel REITs and all other 
REITs. Coefficient estimates represent the marginal effect of variation in a given capital structure characteristic on the firm’s q ratio. Estimates are from the 
regression results for the full study period in Column (1) of Exhibit 7. Estimates for Hotel REITs are the sum of the main effect of the capital structure 
characteristics and the corresponding interaction with the hotel REIT indicator. Where the graph shows only one dot for a capital structure characteristic, 
there are no significant differences in the estimates for hotel REITs and other REITs.
Market leverage
 •  Hotel REITs
 •  All Other REITs
Debt maturity
Fixed-rate debt
Secured debt
Convertible debt
Credit facilities (capacity)
Credit facilities (drawn)
Cash to market value
UPREIT to total equity
FFO payout ratio
Coefficient estimates
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less, the net effect (sum of the two coefficients) remains 
negative. In contrast to REITs as a whole, debt maturity 
shows a significantly negative interaction with the hotel 
REIT indicator, suggesting that the flexibility to exploit fa-
vorable refinancing opportunities, which is embedded in 
shorter debt maturities, is associated with higher q ratios 
in hotel REITs. These results further suggest that investors 
penalized hotel REITs more than other REITs for drawing 
a larger share of their credit facilities outside of the crisis 
period. Then again, hotels were penalized less for expand-
ing the use of credit during the crisis. Further, hotel REITs 
holding more cash achieved higher q ratios, especially 
outside of the crisis period. Last, the results suggest that a 
larger share of UPREIT equity was associated with higher 
q ratios in hotel REITs than in the average REIT.
In sum, my comparison of hotel REITs to U.S. REITs 
as a whole generated the following four main practical 
implications.
(1) Higher leverage is associated with a lower q ratio 
for hotel REITs, but the reduction in the q ratio from 
higher leverage is less severe for hotel REITs than for 
other REITs;
(2) While longer debt maturities seem to be associated 
with higher q ratios in REITs overall, hotel REITs 
with shorter debt maturities have higher q ratios, 
suggesting that hotel REIT investors appreciate the 
flexibility associated with more frequent refinancing 
opportunities;
(3) Larger cash reserves in hotel REITs are associated 
with higher q ratios, in contrast to REITs overall; and
(4) A larger share of UPREIT equity is associated with 
higher q ratios in hotel REITs, where the effect is 
larger than for REITs overall.
One possibility to consider for hotel REITs would 
be to reduce leverage, operations and strategic consider-
ations permitting. While my results suggest that investors 
penalize leverage less heavily in hotel REITs than in the 
average REIT, the effect on q ratios that I document here 
remains negative. Therefore, consistent with the overall 
findings for the REIT sector, reducing leverage may rep-
resent an opportunity for hotel REIT managers to achieve 
higher q ratios.
Conclusion
In this study, I empirically evaluate the implications of 
corporate capital structure for firm quality in a sample 
of international real estate investment trusts. Using 
Tobin’s q as a measure of strength, the strongest firms 
in the full sample have the following characteristics in 
common: low leverage, long debt maturity, high shares of 
fixed-rate debt, and low shares of secured debt. Further, 
these strong firms seem not to have to rely on collateral 
to mitigate lender concerns, and they generally maintain 
low cash holdings. Hotel REITs in the U.S. generally have 
similar characteristics, although their q ratios are not quite 
as high as those of the strongest firms, and hotels are 
distinguished by comparatively shorter debt maturity and 
greater cash holdings. Overall, my findings suggest that 
firm value is supported by a defensive, prudent capital 
structure with low leverage, which further matches debt 
and asset maturity and limits interest rate risk through 
fixed-rate instruments.  n
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